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Triple contingency: The theoretical problem of the public in 
communication societies 
 
[Published in Philosophy and Social Criticism 25(2), 1999, pp. 1-25] 
 
Abstract 
This paper seeks to show that the proposition of ‘double contingency’ introduced by 
Parsons and defended by Luhmann and Habermas is insufficient under the conditions 
of contemporary communication societies.   In the latter context, the increasing 
differentiation and organization of communication processes eventuated in the 
recognition of the epistemic authority of the public, which in turn compels us to 
conceptualize a new level of contingency.   A first step is therefore taken to capture 
the role of the public in communication societies theoretically by what may be called 
‘triple contingency’.   Since the process of the definition of reality and its outcome, to 
which the response of the public is central, is best seen in constructivist terms, 
attention is also paid the relevant methodological and epistemological questions. 
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One of the most important insights gained by the social science, sociology in 
particular, in the recent past is that the public as public is nothing less than a 
constitutive as well as regulative part of societally significant communication 
processes in contemporary societies.   Advancement in the social scientific 
understanding of observation in social processes, stimulated by developments in the 
cognitive sciences and cybernetics, has supported and strengthened this insight.   
During the 1950s and 60s, even acute critically oriented authors such a C Wright 
Mills and Jürgen Habermas1 still found it possible to work with a distinction - i.e., 
between public and mass - that at least in effect denigrated, not unlike the mass 
culture critiques of the time, the larger part of the public.   For some time already, this 
is no longer possible for we have come to recognise that the public plays an active 
part even at the level of mass communication.   This is particularly the case in 
contemporary societies that are increasingly assuming the form of communication 
societies. 
 
Although it has been attracting more and more attention, a proper sociological 
understanding of the role of the public - and hence of observation - in communication 
societies nevertheless still seems to be lacking.   The first step toward such an 
understanding is a theoretical translation of the above-mentioned insight.   The aim of 
this paper is to take this tentative step by advancing the claim that the proposition or 
theorem of double contingency put forward by Parsons and other authors such as 
Habermas and Luhmann is no longer sufficient since today we have to reckon with 
what may be called triple contingency.2     The implications of this more complex 
form of contingency, however, are not only strictly theoretical by nature.   It also has 
a profound methodological impact.   A new light is cast on the sociological 
perspective and hence on the self-understanding of the sociologist.   Indeed, some of 
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the most pressing current methodological debates turn precisely on this issue.   In the 
background, of course, lurk still deeper questions concerning the epistemology of the 
social sciences. 
 
In this paper, I propose first to outline the new understanding of the public, then to 
draw out its theoretical implications in the form of the theorem of triple contingency, 
and finally to follow it up with some epistemological and methodological reflections 
on sociology's characteristic third point of view. 
 
The Public as Constitutive Element of Communication Societies 
 
The social phenomenon of the public made its first appearance in the context of the 
early modern communication revolution.   In the wake of the breakdown of the 
religious world view and the church's loss of monopoly over the official interpretation 
of reality, a socially diverse group of intelligentsia stepped into the breech whose 
members were compelled to appeal to the public to uphold their competing and even 
conflicting interpretations.3    In a period when the number of books in Europe 
increased from thousands to millions, the humanists of the Renaissance were the first 
culture producers to vie for public attention.4   For their successors, the eighteenth 
century men of letters, as well as musicians and artists, who fully experienced the 
shift from patronage to the market, the loss of aura of cultural objects due to their 
transformation into commodities and the change of personal service into an 
impersonal activity, the orientation towards a diffuse and unknown public became a 
dominant feature of their mode of existence.   The rapidly growing reading, theatre-
going, concert-going and art public who in the course of time acquired a new 
competence, aesthetic judgment, was closely related to the emergence and 
consolidation under conditions of mercantilism or early capitalism of a public who 
engaged in critical debate about the state, government and the exercise of political 
power and later became an ineliminable part of modern politics.5  
 
The path followed by the public in its genesis and development since the early 
modern period, particularly the eighteenth century, is clearly marked by legal and 
constitutional milestones.6   Most important among them are the abolition of 
censorship, freedom of thought, freedom of speech or expression, freedom of the 
press, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of demonstration, and today the 
nascent legal constitutionalization of the so-called 'fourth power', the mass media.7   
This trajectory, stretching as it does from an initial lifting of restrictions via the laying 
of institutional foundations to the contemporary protection of the public, is indicative 
of an increasing differentiation and organisation of communicative processes.   We 
witness, on the one extreme, the emergence of the public in the early modern 
communication revolution, followed by its institutional organisation, and, on the 
other, the recognition of the authority of the public in late twentieth century 
communication societies. 
 
(1) Talk 
In the wake of the breakdown of the all-embracing 'catholic' world view, freedom of 
thought and freedom of speech allowed people from all sections of the population to 
think differently about whatever prevailed and to communicate such thought to 
others.   Everything could be conceived differently, and through communication not 
only was everything now at least potentially connected with everything else, but 
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anything could also be changed in this medium.   This applied equally to human 
social relations.   Instead of hierarchy, status and rank, supported by the correct 
obligatory dress code, the emphasis was now on the parity of humanity.   Free 
individuals could now communicate with one another in an unconstrained way, 
engaging in social intercourse in which status was disregarded and rank replaced by 
social tact.   People from diverse backgrounds met more or less by chance and entered 
into spontaneous relations which were in principle open to all potential interaction 
partners.   The public made up of private individuals emerged here within the 
framework of interactions of an episodic nature, presupposing the presence of the 
interacting partners - a simple form of communication variously referred to as 'talk',8 
the 'face-to-face relation',9 'encounters'10 or 'communication au trottoir'.11   
Considering the development of travel, printing, armies and navies, administrative 
structures, markets, money, coffee houses, salons, secret societies, sexual relations, 
marriage, the modern European languages and national communication communities, 
both the micro- and macro-structural conditions of early modern 'commercial society' 
immensely increased the probability of such communication.12
 
 (2) Gatherings 
The actual increase in talk or encounters and in particular the recognition of the rules 
or principles governing social intercourse made possible the deliberate organisation 
and eventually the institutionalisation of the ability to think matters through and to 
communicate the results.   Initially, the organisation of communication took the form 
of gatherings, meetings, assemblies, forums or arenas such as the soladitates of 
travelling scholars, aristocratic conversational circles, learned meetings, and so forth.   
Later, the legal or constitutional establishment of freedom of association and of 
assembly definitively consolidated this new departure.   The Royal Society founded 
on an edict of 1662 is an early example of a legally based institution, while the 
constitutionally based and procedurally regulated political institutions of modern 
times, parliaments in particular, provide another.   To these could further be added the 
interesting instance of organisations and collective protests related to broad social 
movements. 
 
In the case of gatherings at the level of organisation in question here, we witness 
communicative arrangements which are not just public but are organised around a 
particular theme, problem, common concern or issue and, while drawing a self-
selecting membership, are clearly structured into organisers, discussion leaders, 
speakers and audience.   In proportion as simple, episodic interactions are generalised 
in a more abstract and structured form, however, the public undergoes a 
complementary reconstitution.   The presupposition of physical presence still applies, 
but the role of the public develops in a more specific direction.   While attendance is a 
matter of free choice, expressive possibilities are more limited and actual 
participation in the form of a contribution from the floor is circumscribed by the need 
to relate to the speaker and to be relevant.   Besides sheer presence, effective 
expressive forms at the command of the public such as cheering, applause, 
murmering, booing and walking out nevertheless serve as an indication of the 
constitutive sense it retained after its role had changed.   Even the early modern 
executions that Foucault discusses under the title of 'the spectacle of the scaffold' 
would not have made any sense without the presence of the public.13
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(3) Communication Society 
Once communication processes are uncoupled from the physical presence of the 
public, a completely different yet by no means untypical situation under modern 
conditions ensues.   If institutionalised gatherings are a remove away from talk or 
encounters, this new situation is characterised by a still higher degree of abstraction.   
This quality is explicable by reference to the absence of the public.   Generalised 
communication processes come into operation which presuppose a complex 
institutional and technical infrastructure and are oriented towards an unlimited body 
of absent and anonymous addressees.   In is not simply that abstract, anonymous 
interaction and communication situations increased exponentially under modern 
conditions.   It could even be argued that the emergence of modern society, including 
the social sciences, sociology in particular, coincided with the appearance, as it were, 
of the absent, unknown, faceless collective third person, the public.14   The 
institutionalisation of the absent and anonymous public profoundly changed the 
structure and process of public communication and thereby transformed the 
conditions of reproduction of modern societies.   They now definitively became 
communication societies. 
 
Let us look at a few examples.   In law, politics, economics and science, where 
equality, the common good, symbolic exchange and objectivity are respectively 
stressed, the orientation towards the absent and anonymous public is so pervasive that 
those present, even family members and friends, are treated as though they were part 
of this public.15   Beyond these domains which had been well-known already to the 
classical sociologists, however, it is mass media communication in postmodern or 
postsocial societies which today most graphically brings this picture home to us.   
Within these generalised communication processes presupposing a highly complex 
technical base, the communicator's role became fully professionalized and the public's 
role underwent a further complementary change.   Its absence was made complete by 
having been shorn of its ability to make decisions and to act accordingly.   It is on the 
basis of this tendency that mass society theorists and mass culture critics earlier saw 
fit, quite erroneously, to decry mass publics for their passivity.16   Since the ultimate 
concern is communication and not simply self-expression, implying that the number 
of voices clamouring for attention required regulation, the complete absence of the 
public is necessary to give everyone a chance to participate.17   Decisive, further, is 
the significance that attaches to the only remaining form of expression of the public, 
namely public opinion.18   That public opinion is the result of a controversy in which 
a certain degree of agreement was attained, rather than simply a statistical quantity or 
an aggregate of individual opinions, reflects the fact that there are no true experts in 
matters concerning the public sphere.   In public opinion, therefore, we see the mutual 
dependence of the media and the public.   Whereas talk and gatherings lack general 
recognition unless the media provide them with a public arena and shape their themes 
into newsworthy items, the media depend for their impact or effect not only on their 
reception by the public present at episodic and organised interaction processes but 
also on the latter's information input and feedback.   Through talk and gatherings, the 
public provides the media with identified and initially defined problems which admit 
of being made into issues, and the influence actors exercise in public communication 
depends in the final analysis on the resonance and acceptance or agreement of the 
public.   Against this background, it becomes clear that allegedly passive mass 
publics in fact play an active role in mass communication, even if largely as 
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recipients, whether listeners or viewers.19   Besides various opportunities to 
participate, the public possesses a certain authority in that in its own right it is an 
ineradicable and crucial part of generalised communication processes in 
contemporary societies.20   Ultimately, the significance of the public devolves on the 
fact that it and it alone is constitutive of 'the internal structure of the public sphere'21 
within which the communication processes in communication societies take place.   
The public renders determinate, in quite unpredictable ways, what is at first 
indeterminate in public communication. 
 
From Double to Triple Contingency 
 
Introduction of the Concept: Parsons 
Parsons introduced 'double contingency' as a theoretical concept to account at a basic 
level for the possibility of social interaction or communication and, by extension, of 
social order.   The focal point of the concept are the differences between two social 
actors, ego and alter.   In brief, it refers to socially undetermined situations in which 
social interaction remains impossible unless the lack of determination and hence the 
differences between social actors are overcome by those involved.   Any and every 
instance of interaction between two social actors - two being the elementary 
possibility - therefore necessarily takes place under conditions of double contingency.   
On introducing the concept, Parsons stated the theorem or proposition of double 
contingency in the following form: 
 
There is a double contingency inherent in interaction. On the one hand, 
ego's gratifications are contingent on his selection among available 
alternatives. But in turn, alter's reaction will be contingent on ego's 
selection and will result from a complementary selection on alter's 
part. Because of this double contingency, communication, which is the 
preoccupation of cultural patterns, could not exist without both 
generalization from the particularity of the specific situations (which 
are never identical for ego and alter) and stability of meaning which 
can only be assured by 'conventions' observed by both parties.22  
 
Two actors encounter one another in a social situation.   Whatever each does depends 
on what each chooses to do and on what the other does.   For both, the situation is 
equally open in that each could choose this way or that and could decide to react this 
way or that.   Both actors are moreover equally uncertain, for both are potentially 
unlimited sources of words and actions.   To overcome this condition of a situation 
that is equally open and uncertain for both actors, i.e., the condition of double 
contingency,23 they need to relate to one another in such a way that each has stable 
meanings to have recourse to and that the situation becomes one which is common to 
them both.   The question then becomes:  What does Parsons see as the solution to the 
problem posed by the fact of double contingency?   How do the two actors relate to 
one another?   On what basis do the actors make a selection among available 
alternatives?   On what basis do they react to one another? 
 
Parsons' solution to the problem of double contingency takes the form of cultural 
determination.24   Culture, which is always already available as a shared system, 
penetrates action orientations to such an extent that the existence of a value consensus 
can be assumed.   This can be considered from two sides.   On the one hand, culture 
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provides shared symbols or elements of tradition which control general systems of 
orientation.   Decisive for the solution in question, however, cultural patterns of value 
on the other hand are internalised and institutionalised so as to become part of 
personalities and interaction systems as need dispositions and role expectations 
respectively.   Two actors, motivated by their needs, who face one another in an 
encounter generally delineated by cultural symbols, are thus able to relate to each 
other or to enter into social interaction due to the correspondence between or overlap 
of the role expectations or normative orientations they had acquired through 
socialisation. 
 
Assimilation to Communicative Action Theory: Habermas 
In his analysis of Parsons' work, Habermas25 seems to accept the concept of double 
contingency.   He indeed does not confine his critique to an attack only against 
Parsons' proposed solution, i.e., the cultural determination of action orientations, but 
also questions his theory of action.   Yet his own alternative, the theory of 
communicative action, does not invalidate or jettison double contingency.   In fact, 
central to Habermas' position is what he calls 'the problem of coordination'26 in the 
sense of the harmonisation of the plans of action of different actors, and in a later 
work he explicitly accepts Parsons' concept of double contingency.27   On Habermas' 
account, Parsons' theory of action remains attached to both utilitarianism and 
empiricism, and thus not only starts from the monadic or solitary actor but also takes 
the form of a monological theory.   As a consequence, it takes no account of the only 
mechanism by means of which the problem of double contingency could be solved, 
the co-ordinating mechanism of consensus building through language or 
communication.   Parsons does not loose sight of language completely, to be sure, but 
he plays down the communicative aspect of co-ordination in favour of a reified 
concept of culture.   The latter is past oriented, static, objectivist and conceived 
epistemologically, and stands in a static, overlapping or interpenetrative relation to 
institutions and personality. 
Habermas lays the foundations for his own solution to the problem of co-ordination 
generated by double contingency by adopting a theory of action that gives a central 
role to communicative consensus formation.   This theory allows him not only to 
regard culture as fluid and as standing in a flexible relation to institutions and 
personality, but also to take a constructivist view.   Culture, institutions and 
personality are symbolic structures of the lifeworld which are reproduced in the 
medium of communicative action, and interaction participants construct common 
action orientations by using their competences to interpretatively appropriate 
transmitted culture and to relate it either affirmatively or critically to existing norms 
and institutions.   Under conditions of double contingency, communicatively acting 
participants are compelled to construct a common definition of their situation and to 
arrive at some understanding of relevant themes and plans.   Construction of this kind 
is achieved through interpretative work, argumentation, the taking of yes or no 
positions and criticism, while the resulting mutual understanding or agreement 
provides an at least temporary solution to the perennial problem of double 
contingency. 
 
Systems Theoretical Appropriation: Luhmann 
Luhmann28 regards Parsons' theorem of double contingency as being of great 
theoretical importance, but he takes issue with the theoretical framework as well as 
the details of the American theorist's formulation.   Double contingency is a basic 
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condition of the possibility of social action and hence of social systems.   Both social 
action and social systems depend with functional necessity on the solution of the 
problem of double contingency.   Luhmann is critical of Parsons' solution, however.   
To fall back on value consensus is tantamount to banking on the past, reducing social 
order to a problem of socialisation, misunderstanding social evolution as a variant of 
socialisation, and misleading oneself into believing that the constitution of social 
systems depends on an always already available, pre-given, shared cultural system.   
Luhmann's alternative is to conceive of double contingency from the more general 
theoretical point of view of the constitution and continuous processing of meaning 
and to link it to systems theory.   This allows him to regard double contingency as an 
abiding problem that cannot be solved once and for all, and to insist that, rather than 
action subjects, it is either psychic systems or social systems that confront one 
another under such conditions.   Parsons anyway overlooks the fact that social actors 
are constituted within a social system rather than preceding and thus constituting the 
system.   On this basis, Luhmann distinguishes his position from Parsons' by 
introducing temporal and modal theoretical considerations.   First, rather than fixing 
on a pre-given consensus, a solution to double contingency could be sought in a 
temporal process in which a consensus is built up in a manner that is sensitive to 
chance.   Secondly, contingency is a modality that excludes necessity and 
impossibility and thus underlines the possibility of being different or something else.   
These assumptions imply that in the process of encountering each other and 
attempting to overcome double contingency, two 'black boxes'29 are not compelled to 
fall back on the past but could, and in reality do, reach out toward a possible future 
world. 
 
In Luhmann's view, the theory of action to which Parsons remains indebted must be 
surrendered.   Traditional formulas for dealing with the problem of double 
contingency, such as for instance 'reciprocity of perspectives', are inadequate in that 
they assume a symmetry model which neglects the auto-selectivity of perspectives 
and the ungraspability of the other.   Even symbolic interactionism, which correctly 
stresses the use of symbols, operates with only one half of double contingency.30   As 
an action theory, it lacks the means to come to terms with the structure formation 
entailed by the other half.   At this juncture, Luhmann introduces the theory of social 
systems, particularly autopoietic systems theory.   Within this framework, double 
contingency is a permanent, basic problem faced by any and every system.   As an 
'autocatalytically operating problem',31 it brings about a 'state of conditional 
readiness'32 in systems, a systems building possibility in waiting, and thus necessarily 
and inevitably leads to the formation of systems.33
 
Habermas and Luhmann occupy two diametrically opposed positions, yet this 
difference should not be allowed to cloud the similarities between them.   Generally 
speaking, of course, their respective positions are complementary in the sense that 
they focus on the same matter from points of view that cannot be assumed at one and 
the same time.   Whereas Habermas locates himself within the theory of 
communicative action and seeks from that base to account for society as a system, 
Luhmann gives priority to systems theory and undertakes to account for action within 
that framework.   As regards their critiques of Parsons, more specifically, their 
respective positions are comparable in so far as both backtrack to a more general 
processual and constructive point of view and stress an orientation towards the future 
and open possibilities.   But what is more remarkable in the present context is that 
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both, despite attacks against Parsons, accept the theorem of double contingency.   In 
the following paragraphs, by contrast, I propose to develop an argument against this 
very assumption.   Instead of the theorem of double contingency held in common by 
Parsons, Habermas and Luhmann, I am going to take up a suggestion of Klaus Eder 
and Oliver Schmidtke34 to argue in favour of what may be called 'triple contingency'.   
This brings us back, of course, to the significance of the public in contemporary 
communication societies. 
 
The Observer 
Habermas and Luhmann, like Parsons, are able to maintain the idea of double 
contingency only because they make a certain assumption that is by no means 
untypical in the social sciences.   This assumption is more readily apparent in 
proponents of the theory of action, but, as Luhmann's appropriation of the concept of 
double contingency shows, it can even find a place in systems theory.   Positively, it 
amounts to the basic idea that mutually related or involved actors, participants or 
carriers of meaning, that is, essentially no more and no less than two, represent the 
basic unit to which one has to revert were he or she to account for the social world.   
Parsons focuses on 'ego and alter', Habermas similarly prefers 'communicatively 
acting subjects oriented toward mutual understanding', and Luhmann insists on 
mutually intransparent 'black boxes', whether psychic or social systems, which are 
nevertheless able to relate to one another through the assumption of reciprocal 
determinability.   Most frequently, the assumption in question is linked to the 
pervasive idea of social relationships in terms of which the basic building block of the 
social world is the dyad of 'I' and 'Thou', the first person and the second person.   But 
even Luhmann, who points out the limitation of this concept, understands the basic 
situation of double contingency simply as: 'Two black boxes, due to whatever 
coincidence, get involved with one another'.35  
 
Negatively, the assumption underpinning the theorem of double contingency becomes 
apparent from the way in which the third person, the third point of view or the 
observer of social life, is treated.   Although both Habermas and Luhmann36 generally 
speaking have quite sophisticated positions on the observer, the arguments by means 
of which they appropriate the concept of double contingency give no evidence to 
suggest that they recognise this constitutive component of the social world and give it 
its proper due.   The lack of appreciation of the role of the third point of view, or even 
simply the attribution of an impoverished role to it, is indicative of a serious 
theoretical deficiency.37    To correct it, the concept of double contingency needs to 
make way for a more adequate replacement - namely triple contingency.   In the first 
scenario, two social actors, communicatively acting subjects or black boxes, A and B, 
face or encounter one another and enter into some relation with each other as 'I' and 
'Thou'.   In the basic situation of triple contingency, by contrast, there is a third 
perspective, borne by C, who observes what A and B are saying and doing.   By so 
doing, C has a constitutive impact on the social situation.   Indeed, this threefold 
configuration represents the elementary social situation rather than the former twofold 
one.   But it also brings a higher degree of contingency with it. 
 
In the case of double contingency, two actors, subjects or black boxes are compelled 
to make a selection from alternatives while taking the other into account, and thus to 
establish a relation between them.   The inclusion of the third point of view means 
that the social situation in the case of triple contingency is very different and more 
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complicated from the start.   It is not simply a matter of elementary interaction which 
was discussed above under the title of 'talk' or 'encounter'.   The observer belongs to 
the situation as a constitutive part of its sociality.   Over and above the 'I' and 'Thou', 
the third point of view represents society.   It embodies the societal power of 
definition.   C has a constitutive social role in that he, she or it has the power to define 
the situation.   Whatever A and B say and do, therefore, must in principle make sense 
to C.   From the start and throughout, A and B are subject in their interrelations to the 
meaning as defined by society and represented by the observer.   As regards 
contingency, A and B make their choices and take each other into account, while at 
the same time being relativized by a societal definition or collectively accepted 
representation for which the observer stands which itself becomes established only in 
the course of the process.   What this situation of triple contingency entails becomes 
clearer when one considers the centrality and shaping impact of public 
communication in contemporary societies.   Neither the racial conflict in South Africa 
nor apparently now the ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland could have been resolved 
otherwise.   Public communication formed an inherent part of the dynamics of both 
conflicts and the definitional power brought to bear on both by international observers 
and more broadly the observing public proved decisive.38
 
Let us explore the theorem of triple contingency further by taking a somewhat closer 
look at the third point of view.   Two moot points are of particular importance.   The 
first concerns the location of the third point of view:  Is it context independent or does 
it have a foothold in society itself?   The second concerns the epistemological and 
methodological consequences:  Does the third point of view entail a legitimationist or 
a constructivist approach?   Considering Habermas' seminal contribution to the 
recognition of the significance of the public and his tireless efforts to resolve the 
issues raised by it, the following treatment of these questions will make some 
reference to his work. 
 
The Third Point of View: Within or Beyond Society? 
 
In his early work, Habermas traced the genesis in the early modern period of the 
public as the decisive constitutive component of the public sphere.   Against the 
background of the growth of both a cultural and a political public in various European 
countries, he stressed the in principle inclusiveness of the public.39   Despite the 
exclusiveness of a public in any given instance, it could never avoid the general 
significance of its concerns nor could it close itself off completely and bar access to 
those who are able to participate.   It is this basic characteristic of the public, its being 
in principle indefinite and unlimited, that led Habermas to give it the normative 
interpretation which he would later conceive of as domination free discourse or the 
ideal speech situation (1973).40   The idealisation involved here is akin to that 
proposed by his mentor, friend and collaborator Karl-Otto Apel41 in his 
transformation, based on an appropriation of Peirce, of the transcendental self-
consciousness underlying Kant's philosophy into the transcendental or 'ideal 
communication community'.   'Transcendental' or 'ideal' here qualifies the real or 
empirical communication community in so far as it is governed by norms or rules42 - 
such as the acceptance of the basic rules of argumentation, the equality of discourse 
partners, the mutual recognition of discourse partners, etc.   While this idealising 
assumption makes a good deal of philosophical sense, it can from various points of 
view be regarded as too strong.   This position has been taken by many of Habermas' 
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critics, among whom both philosophers and sociologists, even ones sympathetic to 
him.   Recently, he has sought to meet the major thrust of these criticisms by locating 
what he calls the 'third perspective' within society itself.   Let us briefly consider one 
sociologically relevant strain of criticism, and then evaluate this response of his. 
The abiding strain of criticism I have in mind here, which has been stated in the 
1970s and subsequently restated time and time again in varying forms,43 can be 
clarified from two sides.   From one angle, it is argued that Habermas essentially 
concentrates on the reasoning about the organisation of society.   His interest is in the 
ideas that structure the perception of the organisational problems of society and 
argumentation about them.   The underlying aim in doing so is to account for the 
development of the ideals that can historically be attributed to society.   This 
approach, according to the criticism, does not explain anything, however.   It detaches 
itself from both the real historical process and the actual organisation of social 
relations.   Theoretical categorisation combined with the perusal of philosophically 
formulated moral systems predominates, while historically sensitive sociological 
analysis of the generation of such reasoning, ideas and ideals receives insufficient 
attention.   From another angle, it is argued that the concern with the ideals of society 
entails a projection beyond society itself.   Habermas operates with an aprioristic and 
hence pre-sociological assumption regarding the conditions of practical reason.   He 
thinks of it as a normative consensus that results from discourse or reflexive 
communication disburdened of external pressures and power relations - or rather, 
counterfactually, as the anticipated result that would issue from the process were it 
possible to come to a positive end.   This procedure may well be philosophically 
fruitful and justifiable44 and could even be sociologically meaningful in that it 
provides reconstructive analysis with a guideline,45 but the critics doubt whether it 
leaves any room for a negative criterion and hence for a historical universal such as 
hegemony, not to mention exclusion. 
 
In order to counter this criticism, Habermas has submitted that his position is a 
postmetaphysical one.46   Due to the collapse of the religious-metaphysical world 
view and the concurrent transition to a pluralistic society, moral obligations can since 
the eighteenth century no longer be publicly justified by recourse to the transcendent 
point of view of God.   Under current conditions, the place of this standpoint, which 
lies beyond the world, is taken by the moral point of view that represents a 
reconstruction within the world of the lost unity.   In a recent work, Habermas has 
restated this position of 'internal transcendence'47 and sought to give the moral point 
of view a remarkable twist by conceiving of it as a 'third point of view'48 which is 
located 'in society itself'.49   According to him, this is 'the moral point of view in 
terms of which modern societies are criticised by their own social movements'.50   
This means further that 'an affirmative attitude can only be taken toward the negative 
potential in societal tendencies which leads to an unrelenting self-critique'.51   As 
against his critics, particularly the sociologists among them, it is obvious that 
Habermas here suggests that to ascribe to him a concern with reasoning which entails 
a purely positive aprioristic assumption beyond society is mistaken.   The question is, 
however, whether he will be able to uphold this stance.   Is the third point of view he 
defends actually located within rather than beyond society?   And if it is located in 
society, in what sense is this the case? 
 
Recently, Habermas52 has put forward an interesting critique of John Rawls that is all 
the more significant in the present context in that it manifests an unacknowledged 
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shift from double to triple contingency.   In Rawls' understanding, agreement in the 
political domain depends on the citizens adopting two different perspectives: the 
perspective of participants entailed by their adherence to some world view or another, 
and the perspective of observers who register the convergence of the different world 
views and the establishment of an overarching consensus.   Habermas objects that this 
construction presupposes two and only two perspectives, and hence neglects the third 
perspective going beyond them.   This third perspective is the one that those involved 
together adopt and employ in public, the all-embracing public perspective that is 
intersubjectively shared by all those involved.   This accounts for the fact that it 
possesses epistemic authority.   It represents the demands of practical reason that are 
independent of the various world views of the participants and to which the various 
world views are therefore required to submit.   Habermas also describes this 
epistemically authoritative third point of view variously as the impartial perspective, 
the perspective of impartial or critical evaluation and most often as the context 
independent moral point of view. 
It is here that a certain equivocation becomes apparent - one that grows more acute 
when Habermas attributes it to social movements.   Habermas rightly insists on the 
third point of view that the theorem of triple contingency dictates should be regarded 
as coming into play.   But, on the one hand, it is depicted as a context independent 
moral point of view presupposed by everyone and, on the other, it is portrayed as 
embodied by social movements.   This description of the third point of view raises a 
number of related questions:  Can the third point of view be both universalistic and 
tied to a particular collective identity?   How can this be achieved?   Is there not room 
for an  intermediate conception that fits more meaningfully in with the notion of the 
public and its authoritative role in public communication - one that is more directly 
relevant to the social sciences, sociology in particular?   Should the third point of 
view not be tied to the communication process or discourse itself rather than to either 
incommensurable world views or to the universal audience as such or, as in 
Habermas, to both?53
 
These questions bring us to some pressing epistemological and methodological 
implications of the theorem of triple contingency. 
 
Legitimationism or Constructivism? 
 
The theorem of triple contingency implies a new way in which to understand the 
conditions of adequacy of social knowledge.   In terms of the concept of double 
contingency and its solution by means of cultural determination, Parsons conceived of 
these conditions in an apriori normative manner.   This position can be taken as being 
expressive of the traditional sociological stance.   What counts is whether social 
actors in fact know what they could be expected to know, i.e., what they ought to 
know, about social relations and social interaction.   One way of going beyond this 
traditional understanding, is to allow for research to uncover a posteriori the 
competences required by social actors in particular types of social situations.   
Habermas, for instance, proposed a cognitivistic empirical-reconstructive approach 
which stresses ontogenetically acquired action competences and allows a 
differentiated analysis of communicative action in linguistically mediated contexts.54   
This proposal of his is only one of a number of relatively recent contributions to what 
has been called the 'cognitive turn in sociology'55 and is documented in an important 
yet somewhat neglected volume edited by Karin Knorr Cetina and Aaron Cicourel.56   
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The drawback of Habermas’ approach, which is reflected in his retention of the 
concept of double contingency despite the shift from a normative to a cognitive 
position, is that it is ultimately based on psychological assumptions.   The cognitive is 
narrowly understood in terms of the individual mind rather than in terms of the more 
sociologically relevant phenomenon of social knowledge and cultural models.57   In 
the case of triple contingency, by contrast, matters are quite different. 
 
Instead of social actors and cognitive action competences, the concept of triple 
contingency calls for an emphasis on the relational setting or structured situation 
within which actors find themselves and within which their actions take their course.   
Theoretically, this requirement has been met in different ways.   Eugene Rochberg-
Halton,58 for instance, speaks of 'the structured situation' with reference to the 
attempts of such authors as Bourdieu and Eisenstadt to bridge symbolic 
interactionism and structuralism.   Karin Knorr Cetina59 puts forward a position she 
calls 'situationalism' which steers a course between action theory and structuralism, 
between methodological individualism and collectivism.   Margaret Somers60 
proposes an 'institutional and narrative approach' that disaggregates macro-categories 
or totalising metaphors and reassembles them into indeterminate clusters or 
configurations of cultural and institutional relationships expressed in relational 
metaphors.   Rather than society, the focus is on the relational setting in the sense of a 
patterned matrix of relations through which social actors as well as power and 
organisations are contingently connected and positioned.   Eder and Schmidtke,61 in 
turn, argue in favour of a 'situation theoretic model' that is relational and structure 
oriented.   While it takes a plurality of actors, value orientations, actions, motives, 
rational calculations and so forth into account, it proceeds from the structuralist 
assumption that there are rules operative in social situations that co-ordinate action 
events independently of the motives, intentions and goals of the actors.   They link 
these rules to collectively shared representations or cultural codes that are 
communicated within the context of public communication. 
 
In communication societies, social action that makes a difference depends for its 
effect not on the subjective meaning, intention or goal of the actors involved but 
rather on being objectively defined in the social situation as significant action.   The 
constructive context provided by the relational setting or structured situation creates a 
web of relations which makes it possible for those observing the actors involved and 
commenting on them to make a decisive contribution to the definition of the meaning 
of their actions.   In communication societies, the constructive context takes the form 
of the context of public communication or the public sphere.   The actors and 
observers are all components of this public domain, and these components are all 
related to each other through the communication taking place within that context.   
This occurs by being made a medium of communication or being thematized and thus 
being co-ordinated with one another.   A crucial effect of this tendency, which helps 
to account for the centrality and authority of the public in communication societies, is 
that in proportion as actions and relations are co-ordinated by communication, power 
becomes dependent on the acceptance of definitions of reality.62   The more 
communication becomes the mechanism of co-ordination, the more power accrues to 
the public who is in the most propitious position to accept or reject the meanings 
communicated by the participants and thus to fix the collectively accepted definition 
of reality.   What is collectively accepted is a consensus only in the ideal case.   The 
meanings, symbols or codes which are communicated, struggled over and finally 
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accepted are shot through with power, with the result that what is collectively 
accepted rather amounts to a dominant definition of reality, which could involve 
exclusionary mechanisms but more typically now tends to taken the form of 
hegemony.63   Although it is the case, as Apel and Habermas64 maintain from a 
transcendental or universal pragmatic position, that a final consensus is necessarily 
and unavoidably presupposed, communication processes cannot be analysed directly 
and exclusively in terms of such a consensus.   Neither the participants nor even the 
observing public who has the power to define the meaning of the actions of the 
participants know beforehand what the final collectively accepted agreement will 
be.65   The fact that the observing public is itself divided into ‘competing 
counterpublics’66 or into supporters, sympathisers, opponents and bystanders67 
exacerbates this condition of indeterminacy and uncertainty.   This condition, it 
should be emphasised, is precisely the locus of the third moment of contingency in 
question in this paper.   The definition of reality that is eventually accepted in the 
wake of an observed process of communication and struggle over meanings, which 
overcomes this indeterminacy and uncertainty, is a construction achieved not only by 
the participants but in particular also by their audience, the observing public. 
 
Before finally returning to the constructivism that is broached above and comparing 
Habermas' proposal to it, it is necessary first to ferret out some of the epistemological 
implications.   At issue here is in particular the complicated questions of the adequacy 
of social knowledge, the role of the observer and the epistemic authority of the 
sociologist.   Steve Fuller68 has summarised the traditional sociological understanding 
in an epistemological scheme according to which the sociologist has three 
complementary options vis-à-vis the social actors he or she observes.   The first is to 
think like a native, the second to pass oneself off as a native, and finally to abandon 
native categories in favour of theoretical categories.   Interpreting this, one may say 
that, in the first case where social knowledge is equated with self-knowledge, the 
sociologist assumes an observer's role that would suit a subjective hermeneuticist.   In 
the second, where social knowledge is taken to coincide with knowledge of the 
presentation of the self to others, the sociologist adopts the role of the participant 
observer.   In the third, finally, where the conditions of adequacy of social knowledge 
are located beyond the social actors at a level occupied by the social scientist alone, 
the sociologist is an objectivist or reductionist observer either of the positivistic or 
quasi-positivistic type or of the systems theoretical or functionalist type.   These three 
positions, however, do not exhaust all the possibilities.   A new departure is 
represented, for example, by the cognitive turn in sociology.   This could be 
interpreted as the a posteriori revelation by means of indices69 or the 
'reconstruction'70 of action competences.   In this case, the sociologist is a cognitivist 
observer who equates social knowledge with the level of competence demanded of 
social actors in given social situations.   A different interpretation, entailed by the 
theorem of triple contingency, becomes available when one does not confine oneself 
to social actors and their competences but over and above them take seriously the 
social knowledge and cultural models which are embodied in the observing public or, 
differently, are collectively accepted in a given context.   Here the epistemic authority 
of the sociological observer derives from the observing public who places the 
sociologist in a position to identify and specify the collective definitions that are 
empirically operative and effective in the context under observation.71    The 
sociologist remains a cognitivist observer, however, in that he or she focuses on 
cognitive or knowledge structures.   The competences of actors are by no means 
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irrelevant since they have to be considered in terms of how they enter into the 
construction of the collective knowledge that is eventually accepted by the public.   
But most important are the collectively accepted knowledge or cultural models 
embodied by the public.72
 
In various sociological traditions, both old and new, the constructivist approach has 
remained confined to the level of action.   This is true not only of the more obvious 
cases of phenomenology73 and constructivist sociology of science,74 but also of social 
constructivism focusing on social processes75 and of social movement research 
concentrating on collective action and collective identity.76   In the latter case, when 
shared socially constructed ideas are acknowledged, they are confined to the level of 
collective action, and even when public discourse is introduced it is treated as 
external to social movements rather than being the context within which the latter are 
constructed.77   The constructivist approach comes into its own, however, only when 
it is extended to the relational and structured context of social action.78   Once this is 
done, it becomes clear that social or collective action which makes a difference or is 
collectively significant possesses this quality not of its own accord but only because it 
was constructed as such through communication in the public domain.   This 
particular conception of constructivism is one of the most acute yet by no means well-
understood recent insights of the social sciences, and indeed one that closely 
articulates with the concept of triple contingency.   According to it, the constructivist 
perpective focuses on intentions, goals, values and identities linked to social and 
collective action or, differently, on action structures and meanings in so far as they 
are transposed from the actors to the constructive context, from the individuals to the 
communication between them within view of the observing public.   At this latter 
level, they become features or attributes of the relational, structured setting shared by 
the participants and observers alike.   They are collectively accepted and valued and 
in the process power accrues to them.   They thus acquire the role of structuring 
factors, features of the social situation which serve as cultural presuppositions of 
social action and social processes and hence exert a structuring force on all those 
involved. 
 
To bring these reflections on the epistemological and methodological implications of 
the theorem of triple contingency to a close, I want to consider the second of two 
characteristic limitations of Habermas' proposal regarding the third point of view 
against this constructivist background.   Attention was give to the first one earlier, 
i.e., the projection of the third point of view as the transcendent, moral point of view 
that leads to the predilection to analyse processes of construction in terms of a final 
consensus rather than in terms of the sequence of attempts on the part of the 
participants to jointly identify and define a controversial question and to find a 
collectively acceptable solution to it.   The second limitation turns on Habermas' 
locating of the moral point of view in society itself by linking it to social movements.   
Constructivism, by its very nature, forbids the social scientist to adopt an 
identificatory procedure.   It requires that the whole plural range of participants 
relevant to a given constructive context be taken into account without any tendency to 
favour one and hence to identify with it.   To do so, would be to subvert the very 
constructivist perspective the social scientist claims to be upholding.   It would be 
tantamount to taking a legitimationist rather than a constructivist position.79   The 
social scientist identifies with the intentions, goals, values and identity of one of the 
participants and interprets the constructive process in terms of the normative code 
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preferred and communicated by that participant rather than standing back to consider 
the dynamic interplay of the normative codes of all the participants within their 
common setting and the outcome of this dynamic as settled by what is eventually 
collectively accepted.   Although the social scientist might tend to want to identify 
with a social movement struggling for a worthy cause, in the constructivist 
perspective the movement is only one among a plurality of participants all of whom 
warrant equal attention.   In so far as Habermas takes the point of view of a social 
movement, he adopts a legitimationist rather than a constructivist approach, and in so 
far as he interprets the social movement's point of view in terms of the transcendent 
moral point of view projected beyond society rather than as part of a communicative 
process, he exhibits an old discredited predilection for the philosophy of history 
which he has as yet not fully jettisoned. 
 
Although constructivism operates at a certain distance from the participants, this 
approach is not simply morally neutral or devoid of any moral sensibility and 
concern.   Rather than maintaining an immediate relation with a transcendent 
normative standard, as though the social scientist knows what ought to be the case, it 
is a more indirect approach.   Given the nature of language and communication, a 
constructivist analysis undeniably presupposes by pragmatic necessity a reference to 
an indefinite and unlimited community, but its more immediate concern is the public.   
From this it seeks to grasp what is collectively accepted in the particular situation, but 
this does not entail measuring existing reality against a necessary and unavoidable 
presupposition stylised as a normative standard, as Habermas80 insists.   Even if this is 
not a stark confrontation of ideal and reality but an identification of traces of existing 
reason in distorted practices, as he holds, such a procedure tends to cast theory and 
analysis in the form of moralising, i.e., stating what ought to be and pointing out that 
reality does not measure up to this standard.   The constructivist approach, by 
contrast, is more concerned with locating starting points for a new constructive 
learning process that could possibly move in the direction of an unlimited and 
indefinite public.   This requires first that the normative codes of all the participants, 
not just that of a preferred one, be investigated as possible presuppositions for 
furthering constructive learning.   By singling out a social movement and linking his 
normative standard to it, Habermas not only identifies with the movement but also 
renders any critique of it impossible.   All the participants, social movements 
included, must secondly be subjected to a social critique81 that focuses on the 
particular illusion that each entertains in its strategic communication in relation to the 
other participants.   Rather than simply holding up the picture of a transcendent 
normative standard to the participants so that they can begin to appreciate how far 
short their own ideals fall, as does the moral philosopher, the constructivist 
sociologist seeks out the illusory side of these ideals in order to expose the errors that 
need to be corrected.   In this sense, sociology is not exhausted by describing existing 
reality, ‘facticity’, in comparison with a normative standard, ‘validity’, as Habermas82 
proposes, since it specifically undertakes the uncovering and exposure of illusory 
ideals about reality and their effects on what becomes collectively accepted in the 
course of public communication within a particular situation - that is, of course, if 
sociology takes triple contingency seriously. 
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